Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock

 

 

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Defends a second-personal account of testimonial knowledge on the basis of general principles concerning the personal and direct nature of this type of knowledge. 

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Practical knowledge is constituted by states that are both intentions and beliefs. That doesn't entail that intentions are kinds of beliefs; but rather that a single representational state can type both kinds. Only such states can constitute practical knowledge, since the only way to rule out a practical alternative is from the standpoint of an intention.

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[link to Copenhagen 11.24 Handout]

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A defense of my application of Williamson's anti-luminosity argument from recent criticisms.​

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Friendship is an arena for self-revelation. Thus, when working properly, friends experience each other in deeper ways than anyone outside the friendship could hope for. This explains why friends often should have beliefs that represent the other 'in a good light', but in a way consistent with standard evidential norms.

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[link to Inquiry Network Handout]

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TITLE TBD [A critical comparison of Ryle and Plato, commissioned for The Rylean Mind, Matt Dougherty (ed.), Routledge] (co-authored with Allison Piñeros Glasscock)

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Critically compares Ryle and Plato's views, with a focus on teaching and learning.

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The Priority of Margin-for-Error

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Safety (no false belief in nearby cases) is often assumed to be prior to Margin-for-Error (truth in nearby cases). However, Margin-for-Error turns out to be the stronger principle, needed to explain failures of knowledge across cases where Safety is powerless. Thus, Margin-for-Error is more fundamental, which means that certain criticisms of Williamson's anti-luminosity argument miss the mark.

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[Handout SEC]

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​Plain Intentions

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Ordinary intentions are non-conditional in nature. But they're not unconditional. To draw the right boundaries we must carefully distinguish between the content of an attitude, and the background assumptions against which they are held.

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[Handout Moral Psych Research Network]

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​Practical Demonstratives and the Nature of Skill

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One knows how to Φ iff one knows a practical answer to the question ⌜how to Φ?⌝. Such practical answers, in turn, require knowing an answer of the form ⌜this [displaying an action] is a way to Φ⌝, and knowing such an answer is irreducibly a manifestation of agency. The result is a view on which the knowledge and the practical capacities constitutive of skill are co-dependent.​

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Know-How and Generality

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Skills enable their possessors to succeed across an indefinite variety of tasks. To explain this, we must appeal to two features of propositional knowledge: its anti-modularity, and its modal robustness. This vindicates the intellectualist view that skill is fundamentally constituted by propositional knowledge.

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Against Cognitivism in the Philosophy of Action

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Since one can intend and act intentionally without knowing how one acts, one can intend and act intentionally without a corresponding belief.

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Peril and Courage in Plato's Phaedo. (co-authored with Allison Piñeros Glasscock)

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Courage involves risk, but the intellectualist account of virtue in in terms of knowledge (e.g. in the Protagoras) is incompatible with risk. In the Phaedo, Plato essentially invents the notion of 'rational belief' to provide a more realistic intellectualist account of courage.

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Evidence, Transparency, and Knowledge

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Reasons to believe that p are not exhausted by reasons that bear on the question 'whether p?'. However, they are exhausted by reasons that bear on the question 'do I know p?'. This vindicates a more defensible form of evidentialism than the standard argument from transparency.​

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​Intention §45

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There are two viable interpretations for how Anscombe deals with cases where one doesn't act as one takes oneself to be acting: (i) an ahead-of-its-time disjunctivist interpretation, or a (ii) 'botched' interpretation, on which 'what happens' can deviate a lot before it proves one's thought false.

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The Unity in Aristotle's Account of Proper and Incidental Perception ​​

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For Aristotle, the most basic forms of perception are already about unified objects rather than properties. This view plays a crucial role in the argument in DA 3.1 for why there aren't special senses for common perceptibles. Incidental perception requires only our ability to recognize by identifying and reidentifying an 'incidental object' (e.g. Diares's son) with a proper object of perception (e.g. a white thing). It is as such a genuine form of perception, rather than an act of reason, as some have thought.

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Knowing and Valuing

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Why remember facts about a friend or a city you love, when you can simply store this information on your cell phone? Answer: Because valuing isn't constituted simply by practical attitudes; knowing is itself a form of valuing.

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Protest as Second-Personal, Social Address

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Political protests are essentially second-personal social engagements, with their distinctive rational requirements. Because they are second-personal, they aim to give reasons that are grounded in the very act of making a claim; and because they are social, the claim takes an irreducibly plural form ('We demand that you F'). Following MLK, this shows that there's an intrinsic incompatibility between protests and violence.

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Puzzlement (co-authored with Mike Deigan)

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You should puzzle just in case you have no viable answers to to a live question. Puzzlement thus plays a crucial re-structuring role in inquiry, motivating you to reconceive your doxastic structures that prevent you from so much as conceptualizing an answer.​​​

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